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In contrast to criminal procedure in civil law countries, and in
response to abusive prosecutions based primarily on hearsay, common
law courts by the late eighteenth century had established a rule that
evidence against a criminal defendant should be given by a witness with
personal knowledge and should be tested for reliability by adversarial
cross-examination. Ratified in 1791, the Sixth Amendment embodies this
rule in its Confrontation Clause, which guarantees that "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."' Over time, U.S. law developed other rules
for testing the reliability of evidence against the criminally accused,
including allowing a judge to balance factors bearing on the "particular
guarantees of trustworthiness" of a hearsay statement. In 2004, the
Supreme Court disapproved such methods and returned to a rule
reflecting its understanding of the Framers' intent behind the
Confrontation Clause: testimonial statements against a criminal
defendant must be tested by cross-examination in order to be admissible.
Another facet of the early common law was its general distaste for
testimony based on "mere opinion" rather than first-hand knowledge.
Historically, though, common law courts allowed experts to testify
regarding their opinions in an effort to assist the fact-finder understand
the evidence before it. An expert traditionally was permitted to form an
opinion only from facts either that would be received into evidence or
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; M.S., American University,
1997; B.B.A., summa cum laude, Eastern Michigan University, 1994. I wish to thank Professor Roger
C. Park for his helpful guidance with this topic and Jason E. Pate and Matthew R. Tague for their
constructive feedback through various versions of this Note.
i. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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that were personally known to the expert. The Federal Rules of
Evidence and similar state rules depart from the common law and allow
an expert to base opinion testimony on facts not in evidence, including
inadmissible hearsay, if the hearsay is a type of information that experts
in the particular field reasonably rely upon in forming opinions. The
Federal Rules further allow an expert to disclose to the jury the bases of
an opinion, including inadmissible facts, if their probative value in
assisting the jury evaluate the expert's conclusions significantly
outweighs their potential for unfair prejudice.
Although inadmissible facts upon which an expert may base an
opinion are not substantive evidence, permitting an expert to form an
opinion from such facts creates a danger that a jury will accept them as
substantive evidence when presented in the form of an expert opinion.
This danger is particularly acute when an expert's opinion echoes or is
strikingly similar to the inadmissible facts. Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence may allow such an opinion, a Confrontation Clause violation
may arise when an expert forms an opinion on testimonial statements if
the defendant has not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Most courts have concluded that the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied if the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the expert
because his opinion is in evidence -not the underlying facts. Some courts
have also found comfort in admitting an expert's opinion by actively
assessing the reasonableness of the expert's reliance on certain facts and
concluding that if an expert in the field reasonably relied on the facts,
they bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Following the Supreme Court's emphasis on the Framers' intent
behind the Confrontation Clause (which it deduced by examining the
state of the common law at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted),
there are two reasons why these conclusions should be re-examined.
First, the Federal Rules depart from the traditional common law by
allowing an expert witness to form an opinion from inadmissible facts.
Second, in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant,
a court may no longer admit testimonial evidence against a criminal
defendant merely because the statement is particularly reliable. A
common law court in 1791 would not have admitted testimonial hearsay
into evidence without a showing of unavailability and cross-examination
and similarly would not have allowed an expert to base an opinion on
testimonial hearsay. While Congress may change by statute the
acceptable bases for an expert's opinion, a statute may not abrogate a
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. A court therefore must
prohibit an expert from testifying to an opinion in those cases where the
opinion relies upon testimonial hearsay to such an extent that it
substantially transmits to the jury the content of the hearsay, unless the
defendant has an opportunity to test the hearsay by cross-examination.
[V01. 55:15391540
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I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. THE CRAWFORD RULE
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford and his wife, Sylvia, went
looking for Kenneth Lee, a man who allegedly had tried to rape Mrs.
Crawford on an earlier occasion The Crawfords found Mr. Lee at his
apartment, and a fight broke out resulting in a stab wound to Mr. Lee's
torso and a cut in Mr. Crawford's hand. Later that night, the police
interrogated both Mr. Crawford and his wife. Based on their
investigation, the police arrested Mr. Crawford, and the state of
Washington charged him with assault and attempted murder. Mr.
Crawford claimed that he acted in self-defense?
To rebut Mr. Crawford's claim that Mr. Lee reached for a weapon
before the altercation, the state offered into evidence Mrs. Crawford's
tape-recorded statements that she made to the police following the
incident.' In these statements, Mrs. Crawford told the police that she saw
nothing, such as a weapon, in the victim's hands when Mr. Crawford
attacked him. Mrs. Crawford did not testify personally at trial because
Mr. Crawford invoked Washington's marital privilege, which allowed
him to bar his spouse from testifying at trial without his consent but did
not allow him to exclude her out-of-court statements if they satisfied an
exception to the hearsay rule.' The trial court received Mrs. Crawford's
statements into evidence as statements against penal interest, noting that
Mrs. Crawford had admitted to the police that she led Mr. Crawford to
Mr. Lee's apartment and thus facilitated the assault.7
Mr. Crawford argued that, "state law notwithstanding," admitting
his wife's tape-recorded statements to the police into evidence violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Applying
the rule of Ohio v. Roberts,9 the Washington Supreme Court upheld Mr.
2. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1357 (2oo4).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1358.
5. Id. at 1357.
6. Id. at 1357-58. The Federal Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EvIo. 8oI(c). The "hearsay rule" provides that "[h]earsay is not
admissible except as provided by [the Federal Rules of Evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EviD. 802. Washington
has a similar definition of hearsay, WASH. R. EVID. 8OI(c), and a similar hearsay rule, id. 802.
7. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
8. Id.
9. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (i98o) (concluding that the Confrontation Clause bars hearsay if the
declarant is unavailable for cross-examination, unless the statement bears adequate "indicia of
reliability," which can be inferred if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
exhibits "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness").
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Crawford's conviction.'" It concluded that, although Mrs. Crawford's
statements did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, they
bore guarantees of trustworthiness: her account of the incident was
virtually identical" to and therefore "'interlock[ed] with"' the
defendant's confession such that it could be deemed reliable.'2
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court violated
the Confrontation Clause when it admitted Mrs. Crawford's statements
into evidence.' 3 In the process, the Court abandoned the Roberts rule,
concluding that an open-ended balancing test directing a judge to admit
hearsay if he or she finds particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
fundamentally conflicts with the Confrontation Clause's design to
constrain judicial discretion. 4
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, distinguished "testimonial"
from "nontestimonial" statements and, while not comprehensively
defining "testimonial,"' 5 concluded that it at least includes the product of
police interrogation, such as Mrs. Crawford's "recorded statement[s],
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning."' 6 The
opinion concludes that "[wihere testimonial statements are at issue, the
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."'" The Court
in Crawford replaced the Roberts rule with one that more closely reflects
the Court's understanding of the Framers' intent: "Where testimonial
evidence is at issue.., the Sixth Amendment demands what the common
law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
Io. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656,664 (Wash. 2002).
i i. Oddly, the Washington court concluded that Mr. and Mrs. Crawford's stories were identical in
the sense that they were both ambiguous regarding whether the victim had a weapon during the
assault. See id. ("[B]oth of the Crawfords' statements indicate that Lee was possibly grabbing for a
weapon, but they are equally unsure when this event may have taken place. They are also equally
unsure how [Mr. Crawford] received the cut on his hand, leading the court to question when, if ever,
Lee possessed a weapon. In this respect they overlap."). The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that
"[t]he prosecutor obviously did not share the court's view that [Mrs. Crawford's] statement was
ambiguous-he called it 'damning evidence' that 'completely refutes [Mr. Crawford's] claim of self-
defense."' Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373 (quoting the trial transcript).
12. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358 (quoting Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663).
13. Id. at 1374.
14. Id. at 1373.
15. Id. ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are
the modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed.").
16. Id. at 1365 n.4. ("We use the term 'interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical
legal, sense. Just as various definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can imagine various definitions of
'interrogation,' and we need not select among them in this case. [Mrs. Crawford's] recorded
statement... qualifies under any conceivable definition." (citation omitted)).





In Mr. Crawford's case, his wife was "unavailable" because Mr.
Crawford invoked his marital privilege and prevented his wife from
testifying against him. 9 While the Court recognized the rule of forfeiture
by wrongdoing,"0 it did not express an opinion whether Mr. Crawford
forfeited his confrontation right by invoking the marital privilege, as the
issue was not before the Court.2 Although unavailable as a witness, Mrs.
Crawford's hearsay statements were inadmissible under the Court's
newly announced rule because Mr. Crawford had no opportunity to test
the reliability of her statement by cross-examination before or during
trial."
B. "TESTIMONIAL" STATEMENTS
The critical factor bearing on the inadmissibility of Mrs. Crawford's
statements was the conclusion that they were "testimonial."23 The Court
in Crawford identified this element as determinative of whether the
Confrontation Clause applies to a hearsay statement after tracing the
Clause's roots and examining the state of the common law in 1791.4
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court attempts to discern the original
meaning of the Clause and arrives at two conclusions:
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly
its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was
i8. Id.
19. Id. at 1357.
20. Id. at 1370. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), for a description of the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing:
[I]f a witness is absent by [the defendant's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain
if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. The
Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of
his own wrongful acts.... [I]f he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on
his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in
some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been
violated.
Id. at 158.
21. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 n.i.
22. See id. at 1370 ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination."); see also id. at 1369 n.9 ("[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements.... The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant
is present at trial to defend or explain it. (The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.)"(citations omitted)).
23. Id. at 1374 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts,
and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether.").
24. See id. at 1359-63.
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these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's51l; that the Marian statutes1261 invited; that English law's
assertion of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the
founding-era rhetoric decried....
The historical record also supports a second proposition: that the
Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.... [T]he 'right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him,' is most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding.
2 7
The Court noted that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment's core concerns.B The Confrontation Clause's text applies
to "witnesses" against the accused, which the Court defined as "those
who 'bear testimony.'2.9 "'Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.' 3 "An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.""
25. See THE TRIAL OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH, KNT. AT WINCHESTER, FOR HIGH TREASON: I JAMES I.
17TH OF NOVEMBER, A.D. 1603, reprinted in 2 COBBEIT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS I
(Thomas Bayley Howell ed., R. Bagshaw 18o9). Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Crawford
described Raleigh's case:
Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an examination before
the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury. Raleigh
argued that Cobham had lied to save himself: "Cobham is absolutely in the King's mercy; to
excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour." Suspecting that
Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that
"[t]he Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak
it. Call my accuser before my face...." The judges refused, and, despite Raleigh's
protestations that he was being tried "by the Spanish Inquisition," the jury convicted, and
Raleigh was sentenced to death.
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 136o (citations omitted).
26. See I & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555). These bail and
committal statutes required justices of the peace to examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases and
certify the results to the court. Such examinations came to be used as evidence in some cases, resulting
in an adoption of civil law criminal procedure (which condones examination of witnesses in private by
judicial officers) rather than common law procedure (which uses live testimony in court subject to
adversarial testing). See also Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60.
27. Id. at 1363, 1365 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (internal footnotes added).
28. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
29. Id. (quoting I N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
30. Id. (alteration in original). But see id. at 1375 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the Court's inclusion of unsworn testimonial
statements). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the 1828 definition of "Testimony" was "[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Such affirmation
in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written, but must be under oath." Id. (quoting I N. WEBSTER,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (r828) (emphasis added)).
31. Id. at 1364.
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The Court listed three formulations of this core class of
"testimonial" statements: (I) "ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially, '3 (2) "extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,"33 and (3) "statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial."'
While not articulating a comprehensive definition of "testimonial,"35
the Court concluded that "some statements qualify under any
definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing"
and "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations." 6 The Court further concluded that Mrs. Crawford's
statements during her interrogation were "testimonial under any
definition."37
The Court recognized that the common law had established several
exceptions to the hearsay rule by 1791 but noted that, with the exception
of dying declarations, there was little evidence that hearsay exceptions
were used to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a
criminal case.18 "Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that
by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records or
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy."39 The Court did not decide
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial
dying declarations but stated that "[i]f this exception must be accepted
on historical grounds, it is sui generis."°
32. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2oo4) (No.
02-9410)).
33. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
34- Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 3,
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2o04) (No. 02-9410)).
35. See supra note 15.
36. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364; see also supra note 16 (explaining the Court's use of the word
"interrogation").
37. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370.
38. Id. at 1367 & n.6.
39. Id. at 1367.
40. Id. at 1367 n.6.
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II. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
A. THE COMMON LAW
I. Testimonial Capacity Founded on Personal Knowledge
Early in the common law's history, a principle developed that
required witnesses to testify from personal observation: "Witnesses must
testify to nothing except what they are certain of, that is what they have
seen or heard."4' Lord Coke's 1622 statement that "[i]t is no satisfaction
for a witness to say that he 'thinketh' or 'persuadeth himself,"' reflects
the common law's insistence on the most reliable forms of evidence,
rather than testimony based on conjecture or hearsay. ' Chief Baron
Gilbert reiterated this sentiment in the early eighteenth century:
The attestation of the witness must be to what he knows, and not to
that only which he hath heard, for a mere hearsay is no evidence; for it
is his knowledge that must direct the Court and jury on the judgment
of the fact, and not his mere credulity, which is very uncertain and
various in several persons; for testimony being but an appeal to the
knowledge of another, if indeed he doth not know he can be no
evidence.43
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the common law had
firmly established the principle that "[a] witness who states the facts
ought to state those only of which he has personal knowledge."' Federal
Rule of Evidence 602 reflects this traditional rule:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge
of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need
not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses.45
While Rule 602 states the traditional rule requiring a witness to testify
from personal knowledge, it specifically carves out an exception for
expert witnesses.
2. The Opinion Rule
Lord Mansfield stated the rule against opinion testimony in 1766
when he concluded that a witness's testimony was "mere opinion, which
is not evidence." 6 On its face, this rule would appear to bar any
41. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 657(a), at 889 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., 1979) (quoting Thorpe, C.J., in Y.B. 23 Ass., pl. I1 (1359)).
42. 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1917, at 2 (James H. Chadbourn
ed., 1978) (quoting Adams v. Canon, i Dyer 5 3b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 n.15 (K.B. 1622) (Coke, J.)).
43. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 657(a), at 889-9o (quoting CHIEF BARON GILBERT, EVIDENCE 152
(ca. 1726)).
44. 2 id. § 656, at 888 (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 79, 127 (1824)).
45. FED. R. EVID. 602.
46. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1917, at 7 (quoting Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. 1905, 1918 (1766)
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testimony deemed "opinion" as opposed to "fact." However, in Lord
Mansfield's day, the term "'opinion' had the primary meaning of 'notion'
or 'persuasion of the mind without proof or certain knowledge.' The
expression carried an implication of lack of grounds, which is absent
from the contemporary meaning...."4 7  Thus, Lord Mansfield's
sentiment is best understood as a disapproval of unreliable testimony
from witnesses who lacked personal knowledge. '8
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, U.S. courts had expanded
the traditional opinion rule and attempted to limit witnesses' testifying
only to "facts" rather than "opinions":
The general rule requires, that witnesses should depose only to facts,
and such facts too as come within their knowledge. The expression of
opinions, the belief of the witness, or deductions from the facts,
however honestly made, are not proper evidence as coming from the
witness; and when such deductions are made by the witness, the
prerogative of the jury is invaded."9
The opinion rule was more easily stated than practiced, though, as it
rests on the faulty assumption that "facts" and "opinions" are
identifiable and distinguishable." "Any conceivable statement, no matter
how specific, detailed, and 'factual,' is in some measure the product of
inference as well as observation and memory."5' "[T]he distinction
between statements of fact and opinion is, at best, one of degree."5
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 dispenses with the traditional opinion
rule and allows a lay witness to testify "in the form of opinions or
inferences... limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue."53
3. The Exception for Scientific Experts
Although the common law rejected testimony of witnesses who
lacked personal knowledge of the facts-and therefore testified to "mere
opinion" -courts traditionally allowed an exception "where there was a
matter of skill or science to be decided," recognizing that "the jury might
be assisted by the opinion of those peculiarly acquainted with it from
their professions or pursuits.""
(Mansfield, L.C.J.)).
47. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § ii, at 44 (John W. Strong ed., 5 th ed. i999) (quoting SAMUEL
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY (ISt ed. 1755)).
48. Id.
49. Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490,510 (1848).
50. i MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § ii, at 45.
51. id.
52. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988).
53. FED. R. EVID. 701.
54. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 1917, at 7 (quoting Beckwith v. Sydebotham, I Camp. 116, 117
June 2004]
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In early times, and before trial by jury was much developed, there
seem to have been two modes of using what expert knowledge there
was: first, to select as jurymen such persons as were by experience
especially fitted to know the class of facts which were before them, and
second, to call to the aid of the court skilled persons whose opinion it
might adopt or not as it pleased.5
A third method of using experts, calling skilled persons as witnesses
before the jury, later developed? 6 For example, in 1665 in The Witches'
Case, one Dr. Brown gave his opinion that the accused were witches
based on his scientific explanation of the fits to which they were subject.57
Another early example of expert witnesses is Rex v. Pembroke, a 1678
murder trial in which both the prosecution and the prisoner called
physicians as witnesses to testify regarding the cause of certain symptoms
observed during an autopsy and whether a person could die of wounds
without a fever." Similarly, in the 1679 case of Rex v. Green, the
prosecution called a physician to testify that the deceased could not have
died from certain wounds upon his body but must have died from
strangulation.59
By the eighteenth century, the practice of callinE expert witnesses
was well established in the English common law. Expert opinion
testimony at common law was limited, however:
The expert witness could testify only if necessary to provide
information that was beyond the ken of the average juror, could testify
only in response to a hypothetical question, could not assume anything
that was not already in evidence, and could not offer an opinion on the
ultimate issue before the jury.
Experts at common law were likewise limited in the information
upon which they could base their opinion to personally known facts or
facts in evidence presented in the expert's presence or through a
hypothetical question: "The traditional view has been that an expert may
state an opinion based on his firsthand knowledge of the facts, resting on
facts in the record at the time he states his opinion, or based partly on
(1807) (Ellenborough, L.C.J.)).
55. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV.
L. REV. 40,40 (I9OI).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 46 (citing The Witches' Case, 6 Howell, State Trials, 697 (1665)).
58. Id. (citing Rex v. Pembroke, lb. 1337-38, 1340-41 (1678)).
59. Id. (citing Rex v. Green, 7 Howell, State Trials, 185-86 (1679)).
6o. Id. at 47 n.I (citing English cases from 1701 through 1776 in which expert witnesses testified).
61. ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW § io.OI, at 473 (1998); see also Hand, supra note 55, at
48 (describing Lord Mansfield's direction in Rex v. Ferrers, i9 Howell, State Trials, 942-44 (176o), that
the prisoner's counsel may not ask a physician whether, based on all the facts, the prisoner was insane,




firsthand knowledge and partly on the facts of the record. '62
B. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
I. Departure from the Common Law
Unlike the common law, which significantly curtailed the potential
scope of an expert's testimony at trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence
tolerate expert opinion evidence more frequently and to a far greater
extent.63 First, Rule 702 lowers the threshold when deciding if expert
opinion testimony is appropriate from only those cases where it is
"necessary to provide information... beyond the ken of the average
juror"' to situations in which it would merely "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'' Also, the
Federal Rules abandon the hypothetical question -generally
accompanied by a lengthy recitation of the facts in evidence -as the
sole method through which an expert may express an opinion. The Rules
now allow the expert to state on direct examination an opinion and the
reasons for it without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data.
67
The Federal Rules likewise depart from common law tradition and allow
experts to express opinions that embrace the ultimate issue in the case.68
Finally, Rule 703 significantly increases the sources of information which
an expert may tap to find facts that may serve as the basis of an opinion.
69
2. Acceptable Bases of Expert Opinion Evidence Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence
A witness, who qualifies as an expert because of his knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify in the form of an opinion
regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.' Expert
testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data and must be the
product of reliable principles and methods, which must be reliably
62. I MCCORMiCK, supra note 47, § 14, at 67.
63. See PARK ET AL., supra note 6I, § IO.oI, at 473 ("Testimony of once rare experts has become
commonplace, if not overbearing, in courts of every jurisdiction and the limitations on their testimony
have been relaxed substantially.").
64. See supra note 61.
65. FED. R. EVID. 702.
66. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25, 35 (Cal. 1924) (referring to "a long hypothetical
question, contained in some eighty-three pages of typewritten transcript, and an objection involved in
fourteen pages more of the record"); Ingram v. McCuiston, 134 S.E.2d 705, 707-1o (N.C. 1964)
(reciting a hypothetical question twenty-three paragraphs in length).
67. FED. R. EviD. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons
therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.").
68. FED. R. EVID. 704. Federal Rule of Evidence 7o4(b) nevertheless further provides that an
expert may not express an opinion regarding whether a criminal defendant possessed a certain mental
state, which is an element of the crime or a defense. Id.
69. See infra Part II.B.2.
70. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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applied to the facts of the case.7'
An expert may base his opinion on facts or data perceived by him or
made known to him before or during the hearing.72 Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 permits an expert to base his opinion on facts that are
inadmissible in evidence, if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field to form opinions on the subject matter.73 As
amended in 2000, Rule 703 allows the party offering the expert's opinion
to disclose to the jury inadmissible facts that the expert considered only if
the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect.74
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules explains that by
allowing an expert to derive his opinion from facts or data presented to
him outside of court or by a means other than his own perception, Rule
703 was designed to depart from the common law "and to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court."'75 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 703 cites
as an example a physician who likely "in his own practice bases his
diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable
variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and
opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records,
and X rays." The Advisory Committee concludes that "[tihe physician
makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon [such facts and data]. His
validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought
to suffice for judicial purposes." 6
In its Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule 703, the
Advisory Committee explains that the rule was "amended to emphasize
7. Id. An expert's "major premise" is "a principle, procedure, or explanatory theory derived by
an inductive, scientific technique." Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The
Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1988). Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (993),
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(i999), provide the rules associated with permissible major premises for an expert's testimony.
72. FED. R. EvID. 703. An expert's "minor premise" relates to the particular facts of the case, to
which the expert applies a major premise to arrive at a conclusion. Imwinkelried, supra note 71, at 2.
73. FED. R. EviD. 703. Many states similarly allow an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible
evidence, if such information is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. E.g., CAL. EVD. CODE §
8oi(b) (Deering 2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.704 (2004); People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 172 (N.Y. 1974)
(recognizing such a rule in New York but noting that in a proper case, it must yield to a defendant's
right to confront the witnesses against him). But see MICH. R. EvID. 703 ("The facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference shall be in evidence.").
74. FED. R. EvID. 703; see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 802 ("A witness testifying in the form of an
opinion may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter ... upon which it is
based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion.").




that when an expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to
form an opinion or inference, the underlying information is not
admissible simply because the opinion or inference is admitted."77 Rule
703 creates "a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information
used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not admissible for any
substantive purpose, when that information is offered by the proponent
of the expert."7 Nevertheless, "[t]he information may be disclosed to the
jury, upon objection, [but] only if the trial court finds that the probative
value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's
opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect."79 The Advisory
Committee instructs a trial judge to give a limiting instruction upon
request, informing the jury that otherwise inadmissible underlying facts
must not be used for substantive purposes and adds that "the trial court
should consider the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a
limiting instruction under the particular circumstances. ' 's°
Although the rule, as amended, does not allow inadmissible facts to
come into evidence, the rule may permit the proponent of the opinion to
disclose to the jury inadmissible facts and data, provided the balancing
test described above is satisfied. Rule 703 also does not in any way
prohibit an expert from using inadmissible facts or data to arrive at an
opinion:
The amendment governs only the disclosure to the jury of information
that is reasonably relied on by an expert, when that information is not
admissible for substantive purposes. It is not intended to affect the
admissibility of an expert's testimony. Nor does the amendment
prevent an expert from relying on information that is inadmissible for
substantive purposes.8'
Some of the information that may be disclosed to the jury or used by
an expert in forming his opinion may, if offered into evidence, violate not
only the Federal Rules of Evidence but also the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment because the information may be testimonial in
nature and the defendant may not have had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.
77. Prior to the 200o amendment, commentators disagreed whether courts should admit into
evidence the facts or data upon which experts relied in forming an opinion. Compare Ronald L.
Carlson, Essay, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 584-86 (1986)
(arguing that admission of unauthenticated background data violates the hearsay rule and impinges a
criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause rights) with Paul R. Rice, Essay, Inadmissible Evidence as a
Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584
(1987) (arguing that with appropriate precautions, admission of background material does not violate
the spirit of the hearsay rule or cause Confrontation Clause problems).






III. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE AS AN UNOFFICIAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION
As discussed above, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 is not an
exception to the hearsay rule because it does not allow into evidence the
facts upon which an expert witness bases his opinion. The expert's
opinion is in evidence, but the underlying facts may not be. For members
of the jury, however, untying an expert's opinion from its underlying
facts may prove difficult:
[O]n the one hand, the jury may consider the facts or data upon which
the expert based her opinion to assess the weight to be given to that
opinion. Yet, on the other hand, the jury, when deciding whether to
arrive at the same conclusion, cannot accept what the expert relied
upon as true....
.... [O]ne cannot accept an opinion as true without 8implicitly
accepting the facts upon which the expert based that opinion.
Because Rule 703 allows an expert to testify to an opinion based on
inadmissible evidence -including testimonial hearsay-which may be
disclosed to the jury (and which the jury may unwittingly accept for the
truth of the matter asserted), some have recognized that "for some but
not all practical purposes, Rule 703 operates as the equivalent of an
additional exception to the rule against hearsay."
'' 3
As a limit on the type of information that experts may use to form
their opinions, Rule 7o3 requires that inadmissible background facts be
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."'' A judge decides as a
preliminary question under Federal Rule of Evidence Io4(a)8' whether
an expert opinion is based on information reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field "in a manner that will 'prevent inadmissible evidence
from being suggested to the jury."' 6 Courts differ, though, in their
approach to determining what information satisfies Rule 703's
"reasonably relied upon" requirement.
82. Rice, supra note 77, at 584-85.
83. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.J, at 605 (4th ed. 1996).
84. FED. R. EVID. 703.
85. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court....").
86. PARK ET AL., supra note 6I, § io.o8, at 493 (quoting FED. R. Evm. io3(c)); see also In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 6ii F. Supp. 1223, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The trial court must
decide whether [the] data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field." (citing FED. R.
EVID. 104(a)), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 15, at n. i6 ("Plainly,
the judge must make the finding of fact as to what the experts' practice is and then determine whether
it is objectively reasonable.").
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A. THE LIBERAL APPROACH TO ACCEPTING EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
"Those following the liberal approach hold that the courts may not
independently determine whether experts in the field reasonably rely on
a given type of data."s For example, courts following this approach
instruct that "the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of what
data they find reasonably reliable. ' 'w Following this theory, when a judge
finds that it is customary practice for experts in the particular field to
consider a certain type of report, "the judge's hands are tied; the judge
must allow the expert to relZ on that type of report," regardless of how
unreasonable it may appear.
A court following the liberal approach may allow an expert to testify
to an opinion that largely echoes inadmissible hearsay: "The difficulty
with the liberal approach is that a party can employ an expert witness to
place untrustworthy facts, data, or opinions before the jury-a sort of
'backdoor' hearsay exception."' Beyond merely unreliable facts, data, or
opinions, a court, under Rule 703, could permit an expert to testify to an
opinion against a criminal defendant that essentially channels testimonial
hearsay to the jury.
B. THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO ACCEPTING EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
Many courts and commentators take a different view toward a
court's role in determining the appropriateness of information that an
expert may use as a basis for his opinion. Those following the
"restrictive" approach contend that courts must make an independent
assessment of the reliability of underlying facts and determine whether it
was reasonable for an expert to rely on them.9 For these courts, "if the
87. JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C. L. REV. 53,
75-76 (1994); see also I McCoRMICK, supra note 47, § 15, at 74 ("The liberal approach is that the judge
must accept the experts' view in deciding whether the rule is met at least in matters in which the judge
is not equipped to 'second guess' the expert.").
88. Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Indian Coffee Corp.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 897 (3d Cir. 1985) ("A court may not substitute its judgment
for that of experts in the field... as to what.., data an expert should rely upon in reaching an
opinion, for in doing so it invades the province of the jury."); Mannino v. Int'l Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846,
853 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Great liberality is allowed the expert in determining the basis of his opinions
under Rule 703. Whether an opinion should be accepted is not for the trial judge. That is for the finder
of fact.").
89. s McCORMICK, supra note 47, § 15, at 74.
9o. Id.; see also Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 868 (1992) ("Although there are a growing number of
opinions leading in the proper direction, some courts endorse the passive approach that allows
wholesale admission of underlying documents.").
91. See, e.g., Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 945, 944 (ioth Cit. 1989) (recognizing that experts
are given wide latitude to testify on facts otherwise not admissible in evidence but that the district
courts must decide if the bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility);
Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that generally questions
relating to the sources of an expert's opinion affect its weight, not its admissibility but that in some
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data would have been or was excluded from the record as hearsay and
lacks any circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness comparable to an
exception to the hearsay rule, the standard of Rule 703 is not met."92 For
example, one district court has described Rule 703's protection against
introduction of unreliable hearsay as follows:
Rule 703 permits experts to rely upon hearsay. The guarantee of
trustworthiness is that it be of the kind normally employed by experts
in the field. The expert is assumed, if he meets the test of Rule 702, to
have the skill to properly evaluate the hearsay, giving it probative force
appropriate to the circumstances.'
Similarly, one commentator has argued that courts may admit into
evidence the facts underlying experts' opinions under the residual
hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 807' "[i]f courts properly
scrutinize expert testimony to ensure that each expert has used her
special talents in screening the facts upon which she has relied."95
Likewise, prior to the Crawford decision, a Confrontation Clause
violation would not occur provided the hearsay statement "[bore]
sufficient indicia of reliability."" After Crawford, though, "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" no longer satisfy the strictures of the Sixth
cases, "the source upon which an expert's opinion relies is of such little weight that the jury should not
be permitted to receive that opinion"); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (2d
Cir. 1984) (concluding that the district court has the discretionary right under Rule 703 to determine
whether the expert acted reasonably in making assumptions of fact upon which he would base his
testimony); Agent Orange, 61i F. Supp. at 1245 ("If the underlying data are so lacking in probative
force and reliability that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests
entirely upon them must be excluded."); i McCoRMICK, supra note 47, §15, at 74-75 ("In the main, the
restrictive approach is preferable both as a matter of policy and as a question of statutory
construction."); Epps, supra note 87, at 76 (arguing that "Rule 703 imposes an active obligation on
courts to determine the reasonableness of an expert's reliance on otherwise inadmissible facts or
data"); L.L. Plotkin, Recent Development, Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What Is the
Court's Role in Evaluating Expert Testimony?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1269-7o (I99o) (arguing that
active judicial review of expert testimony will lead to more accurate jury verdicts and allow trial courts
to monitor experts and ensure that they are acting as unbiased witnesses).
92. I MCCORMICK, supra note 47, §15 at 74.
93. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1245.
94. FED. R. EVID. 807 provides the following:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence....
95. Rice, supra note 77, at 59!.
96. Id. at 595; see Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3 d 1I55, 1163 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
although "Rule 703 evidence is... never admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but simply to
show a basis for an expert's opinion," even if it were admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, it
would not violate the Confrontation Clause because it exhibits particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness "shown by the testifying expert's reliance on the material in forming his opinion"); see
also supra note 9.
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Amendment.' Therefore, a risk exists-even in those courts following a
restrictive approach to admissibility of expert testimony-that a
prosecutor may use an expert to communicate testimonial hearsay to the
jury in violation of the Confrontation Clause.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND EXPERT
OPINION EVIDENCE
A. CURRENT LAW
Courts generally hold that if a defendant has an opportunity to
cross-examine an expert witness who testifies against the defendant, the
Confrontation Clause is satisfied, even if the expert relied on hearsay to
form the basis of his opinion." This derives from the concept that the
expert's opinion-not the facts that the expert considered-is in
evidence, and the defendant has a full opportunity to test the soundness
of that evidence by cross-examining the expert. Under Rule 703,
inadmissible facts upon which an expert relied may be disclosed to the
jury, not for their truth, but to "assist[] the jury to evaluate the expert's
opinion. '  The Supreme Court in Crawford noted that the
Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,'" which
appears to reinforce the majority rule regarding the Confrontation
Clause and expert opinion evidence. A potential confrontation problem
arises, however, if a jury accepts testimonial hearsay-presented either
under Rule 703 to assist in evaluating the expert's opinion or through an
expert "opinion" which essentially consists of recitation of hearsay-for
its truth.
B. EXAMPLES OF EXPERT OPINION BASED ON TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
Prosecutors use expert testimony extensively in criminal trials.
Experts, for example, frequently express opinions about whether a
defendant suffers from mental disease or defect,"0 ' how criminal
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. See, e.g., Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) ("[Tjhe Confrontation Clause is
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose ...
infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for
giving scant weight to the witness' testimony."); United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir.
i996) ("[W]e recognize that the right to confrontation is not violated by an expert's reliance on out-of-
court sources where the utility of trial confrontation would be remote and of little value to either the
jury or the defendant."); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that an
expert's reliance on information provided by others does not violate the Sixth Amendment if the
expert is available for cross examination) (citing Reardon v. Manson, 8o6 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986)).
99. FED. R. Evm. 703.
too. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S.
409, 414 (1985)).
iot. See, e.g., United States v. Blumberg, 961 F.2d 787,789 (8th Cir. i992).
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enterprises operate,' °2 and the results of fingerprint, handwriting, or
DNA analyses."° Sometimes, the facts upon which an expert bases an
opinion amount to testimonial hearsay and present a risk of violating a
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.
One example is United States v. Brown."° The defendant in Brown
was traveling from Jamaica to Bermuda through Miami when U.S.
Customs officers discovered cocaine base (the form of the drug from
which powdered cocaine is derived) in the metal frames of her luggage
carts. I°" The government indicted the defendant with importation of a
substance containing cocaine and possession with intent to distribute.'
°6
The defendant, in her defense, claimed to have no knowledge that the
substance was in her luggage carts."° The government responded with
evidence that the wholesale value in Bermuda of the cocaine base was
approximately $217,000 and argued that an unknowing innocent would
not have been entrusted with such valuable contraband. l8
To prove the value of the cocaine base in the Brown trial, the
government relied primarily on the testimony of a DEA agent, qualified
as an expert in the field of drug valuation."° Although the expert witness
had substantial personal experience investigating narcotics smuggling, he
explained on cross-examination that he could not have offered his
testimony on the value of the cocaine base without information he
received from an agent in another DEA office, who herself had
conferred with authorities in Bermuda to arrive at an estimated value."
Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the expert's testimony
"clearly constituted hearsay" because the testimony related statements of
another DEA officer and Bermudan authorities to prove the truth of the
matter asserted (i.e., the price of drugs in Bermuda),"' the court
nevertheless concluded that the trial court properly admitted the expert
testimony into evidence:
We have no trouble concluding that Rule 703 encompasses hearsay
statements in a context such as the instant one, where the government
expert specifically testified that his opinion was based on his
102. See, e.g., Locascio, 6 F.3d at 938 (structure and operating rules of organized crime families);
United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 9o , 96 (2d Cir. 1986) (operation of narcotics dealers).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2004) (mitochondrial DNA
testing); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 263 (4th Cit. 2003) (forensic fingerprint and handwriting
analysis); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 147, ti6o (6th Cir. 1997) (handwriting analysis).
104. 299 F.3d 1252 (iith Cit. 2002), vacated by 538 U.S. 1OlO (2oo3), reinstated by 342 F.3d 1245,
1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 1254.
lO6. Id.
Io7. Id.
io8. Id. at 1255.
io9. Id.
iio. Id. at 1256.
iii. Id. at 1256 n.2.
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experience and expertise, in conjunction with the information he
received from a DEA intelligence agent and Bermudan authorities,
and that such sources of information were regularly relied upon in
valuating narcotics."2
Regarding the Confrontation Clause, the Brown court relied on the
first prong of the rule in Ohio v. Roberts"3 and ruled as follows:
Given Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and long-established circuit
precedent, we hold that hearsay evidence relied upon by an expert in
forming his opinion, as long as it is of a type regularly relied upon by
experts in that field, is a "firmly rooted" exception to the general rule
of exclusion of hearsay statements, and therefore is not violative of a
criminal defendant's confrontation rights."
4
This ruling exhibits several apparent problems. First, the circuit
precedent upon which the court relied, United States v. Williams,"5 pre-
dates the 2ooo amendment to Rule 703, which emphasized that Rule 703
is not an exception to the hearsay rule.' 6 Also, the court in Williams
concluded that the expert opinion offered there was not "offered for the
purpose of establishing the truth""7 of the underlying facts; this conflicts
with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Brown that the DEA expert's
testimony was "clearly" offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
by the expert's sources. ' Finally, at common law, hearsay was not an
acceptable basis for expert testimony,"'" so although a court in 1971
considered expert testimony an exception to the hearsay rule, it is
doubtful that it was "firmly rooted" as a hearsay exception in 1791.
The Brown ruling may present even more problems when
considering the rule announced in Crawford. The statements upon which
the expert witness based his opinion regarding the value of the cocaine
base-statements from another DEA agent and Bermudan authorities-
were clearly made "under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement[s] would be available for
use at a later trial."'," Therefore, the statements appear to fit the
Supreme Court's definition of "testimonial" hearsay. Moreover, because
the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay
declarants and because the expert witness essentially repeated what
I12. Id. at 1257.
113. See supra note 9.
114. Brown, 299 F.3d at 1258.
115. 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc). (Note that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued
before October i, 1981 are binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (ixth Cir. 1981) (en banc).)
116. See supra Part II.B.2.
II7. Williams, 447 F.2d at 1291 (quoting H. & H. Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 553, 555
(Ioth Cir. 1952)).
i is. See supra note i i i and accompanying text.
i I9. See supra Part II.A.3.
120. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2oo4).
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hearsay declarants told him while adding little expertise of his own (the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the expert's testimony sought to prove
the truth of the underlying statements), a strong argument exists that the
defendant's confrontation rights were violated.
Other cases exist where courts have allowed prosecution experts to
testify to opinions based on testimonial hearsay. In People v. Gardeley,
for example, a police detective testified that the defendants had
committed a "gang related" crime under California law, based in part on
an interview that he conducted with a third suspect, who pled guilty and
was not on trial. 2' Over a hearsay objection, the trial court allowed the
detective to disclose to the jury the contents of the interview but
instructed the jury not to consider the hearsay for its truth but only as it
gave rise to the detective's expert opinion.'22 The detective also based his
opinion on "conversations with the defendants and with other [gang]
members, his personal investigations of hundreds of crimes committed by
gang members, as well as information from his colleagues and various
law enforcement agencies.' 2.3 Because "[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations" are testimonial,'24 the court in
this case allowed an expert police witness to directly relate testimonial
hearsay to the jury. Some of the other information that the expert relied
upon may also have been testimonial, such as information gathered from
other law enforcement officers (as in Brown). Some of the information
upon which the detective relied, however, such as the statements made
by the defendants themselves'25 and results of personal investigations of
other crimes, would most likely not present Confrontation Clause issues.
In a case where an expert forms an opinion from many sources, including
his own experience, rather than simply relating testimonial hearsay to the
jury, there is less risk of a Confrontation Clause violation."'
Sometimes courts recognize that an expert witness may go too far in
conveying hearsay to the jury, thereby violating a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights. An example is United States v. Dukagjini.'7
Dukagjini was a federal drug prosecution in which a DEA agent assigned
to the case testified as the prosecution's expert witness regarding the use
121. 927 P.2d 713, 717 (Cal. 1996).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 722.
124. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
125. See id. at 1369 n.9 ("The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant
is present at trial to defend or explain it.").
126. Cf United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1970) ("When... the witness has
gone to many sources-although some or all be hearsay in nature-and rather than introducing mere
summaries of each source he uses them all, along with his own professional experience, to arrive at his
opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as an attempt to introduce
hearsay in disguise.").
127. 326 F.3 d 45 (2d Cir. 2002).
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of code words in narcotics conversations.12 The agent "recited as the
basis for his conclusions both his prior law enforcement experience and
his 'knowledge of the investigation' from the wire-tapped conversations
and his personal conversations with the other agents, witnesses, and co-
conspirators.' 29 The Second Circuit commented that the agent's
"conclusions appear[ed] to have been drawn largely from his knowledge
of the case file and upon his conversations with co-conspirators, rather
than upon his extensive general experience with the drug industry.' 3°
While wire-tapped conversations between co-conspirators would
generally not constitute testimonial hearsay,'3' conversations between an
investigating agent and other agents, witnesses, and co-conspirators
appear to be similar to the type of testimonial hearsay that the Supreme
Court identified in Crawford.'L
The court in Dukagfini warned that allowing a case agent or a fact
witness to also testify as an expert presents a risk that inadmissible and
prejudicial testimony will be proffered:
As the testimony of the case agent moves from interpreting individual
code words to providing an overall conclusion of criminal conduct, the
process tends to more closely resemble the grand jury practice,
improper at trial, of a single agent simply summarizing an investigation
by others that is not part of the record. 33
The court similarly recognized a significant risk that if the witness
digresses from his expertise, he will be improperly relying upon hearsay
evidence and may convey hearsay to the jury.' The court therefore held
that "an expert witness may rely on hearsay evidence while reliably
applying expertise to that hearsay evidence, but may not rely on hearsay
for any other aspect of his testimony" because such testimony "violates
Rule 703, the hearsay rule, and the Confrontation Clause." '
The Second Circuit concluded that the DEA agent in Dukagfini
"plainly was not translating drug jargon, applying expert methodology,
or relying on his general experience in law enforcement. Rather, he was
relying on his conversations with non-testifying witnesses and co-
12& Id. at 49-50.
129. Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 55.
131. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1367 (2004) (noting that statements in furtherance
of a conspiracy are by their nature not testimonial).
132. This conclusion is dependent upon a finding that the "conversations" involved amounted to
police "interrogations" (for example, statements knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning). See supra note i6 and accompanying text.
133. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 54; see also United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. i98i)
(noting that it would violate the Confrontation Clause if the government "simply produce[d] a witness
who did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements made by others").
134. Dukagjini, 326 F.3 d at 59.
135. Id. at 58.
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defendants in order to prove 'the truth of the matter asserted' about the
meaning of the drug conversations." , 6 Consequently, the Second Circuit
held that the district court erred in permitting the agent's testimony in
violation of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause because
rather than "rely[ing] on hearsay evidence for the purposes of rendering
an opinion based on his expertise ... the expert was repeating hearsay
evidence without applying any expertise whatsoever, thereby enabling
the government to circumvent the rules prohibiting hearsay." '37
C. SUMMARY
These cases demonstrate that there is a continuum of situations in
the analysis of whether an expert opinion based on testimonial hearsay
violates the Confrontation Clause. On one end of the spectrum are
experts who base their opinions almost solely on testimonial hearsay and
merely recount to the jury what others have said. This type of expert
opinion is almost surely a violation of the Confrontation Clause if the
defendant cannot test the reliability of the expert's testimony by cross-
examining the declarants of the underlying statements. On the other end
of the spectrum exist cases where an expert has relied on a number of
sources and types of data and has added significant expertise to interpret
and analyze them. In these circumstances, a confrontation violation
likely will not exist because the expert's opinion is truly original and a
product of his special knowledge or experience, and the defendant can
test its reliability by cross-examination of the expert.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Crawford v. Washington, admission of particularly
trustworthy hearsay against a criminal defendant was thought to be
acceptable under the Confrontation Clause. After the Supreme Court's
return to the Framers' intent behind the Confrontation Clause in
Crawford, though, "particularly trustworthy" is no longer sufficient;
defendants must have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants of
all testimonial statements used against them.
The Federal Rules of Evidence lifted the common law's restrictions
on the facts and data that an expert witness may permissibly consider in
forming an opinion. Experts may now rely on-and disclose to the jury-
inadmissible hearsay that forms the basis of their opinions. Such hearsay,
though, must be a type reasonably relied upon by similar experts in the
field, which leads some courts to consider it particularly trustworthy. This
Note has attempted to highlight that because "particularly trustworthy"
is no longer sufficient for the Confrontation Clause, a risk exists that
136. Id. at 59 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 8oI(c)).
137. Id. The court nevertheless concluded that the Confrontation Clause violation was not "plain
error" and that the hearsay violation was "harmless error." Id. at 61-62.
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expert testimony will violate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights
when an expert -particularly a police expert who also has investigated
the crime-relies too heavily on testimonial hearsay. This may happen
when the opinion merely restates the facts, rather than adding substantial
expertise and analysis. Because members of the jury may have difficulty
accepting an expert's opinion without accepting the truth of the facts
upon which he relied, courts should consider whether an expert's opinion
that relies on testimonial hearsay violates the defendant's right to
confront the witnesses against him.
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